Charles Ci Wen Lim, Christopher Portmann, Marco Tomamichel, Renato Renner, Nicolas Gisin
One must be careful when assessing the security of practical quantum key distribution systems as real devices do not necessarily comply with the assumed theoretical models. In fact, a complete characterization of the devices is required by most security proofs---which is a non-trivial task in practice. In this work, we propose a quantum cryptography protocol that only requires partial knowledge of the devices. Specifically, the security of the protocol is based on a novel self-testing procedure where Alice and Bob perform Bell tests independently of each other. Then, by establishing a relation between the local Bell tests and a recent entropic uncertainty relation, we show that the protocol is secure against general attacks in the finite key size regime.
View original:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1208.0023
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