Normand J. Beaudry, Marco Lucamarini, Stefano Mancini, Renato Renner
Quantum key distribution protocols typically make use of a one-way quantum channel to distribute a shared secret string to two distant users. However, protocols exploiting a two-way quantum channel have been proposed as an alternative route to the same goal, with the potential advantage of outperforming one-way protocols. In this paper we provide a strategy to prove security for two-way quantum key distribution protocols against the most general quantum attack possible by an eavesdropper. We apply this method to prove the security of two important examples of such protocols. In our analysis we utilize an entropic uncertainty relation, which results in partially device-independent security, where only a few assumptions need to be made about the devices used in the protocol. We also show that a two-way protocol can outperform comparable one-way protocols in some scenarios.
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http://arxiv.org/abs/1301.3138
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