Friday, June 7, 2013

1306.1277 (Osamu Hirota)

Misconception in Theory of Quantum Key Distribution -Reply to Renner-    [PDF]

Osamu Hirota
It has been pointed out by Yuen that the security theory of quantum key distribution(QKD) guided by Shor-Preskill theory has serious defects, in particular their key rate theory is not correct. Theory groups of QKD tried to improve several defects. Especially, Renner employed trace distance and quantum leftover Hash Lemma. However, the present theory encountered a problem of a quantitative evaluation of security. To cope with it, he uses a wrong interpretation on the trace distance and its level epsilon_{sec}, and justifies the unconditional security of own system when epsilon_{sec} is 10^{-6 } ~ 10^{-20}. In this paper, we discuss the following problems. What is the origin of the misconception of the present theory? How does the present theory lead to the misconception?. To show their process toward the misconception, Koashi-Preskill's theory which has a typical misconception is examined. A main point of our comment is that QKD theory ignores the security requirement against attacker which is necessary to compare whole encryption schemes from classical to quantum. To clarify it, we emphasize that the trace distance itself cannot have any operational meaning such as failure probability, and it is only mathematical tool as a measure of closeness. As a result, it is given that the security with above values derived from their formulation means nothing in the general cryptological sense. In addition, I point out that a comment by Bennett and Riedel on unconditional security of QKD is not correct. Also, I point out that the experimental systems of groups of Los Alamos, Toshiba-UK, NICT, and others cannot have security guarantee even in future.
View original: http://arxiv.org/abs/1306.1277

No comments:

Post a Comment