Thursday, July 4, 2013

1307.1081 (Marcos Curty et al.)

Finite-key analysis for measurement-device-independent quantum key

Marcos Curty, Feihu Xu, Wei Cui, Charles Ci Wen Lim, Kiyoshi Tamaki, Hoi-Kwong Lo
Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditionally secure communications. However, as practical devices tend to deviate from their specifications, the security of some practical QKD systems is no longer valid. In particular, an adversary can exploit imperfect detectors to learn a large part of the secret key, even though the security proof claims otherwise. Recently, a practical approach---measurement-device-independent QKD (mdiQKD)---has been proposed to solve this problem. However, so far the security has only been fully proven under the assumption that the legitimate users of the system have unlimited resources. Here we fill this gap and provide a rigorous security proof of mdiQKD against general attacks in the finite-key regime. This is obtained by applying large deviation theory, specifically the Chernoff bound, to perform parameter estimation. For the first time we demonstrate the feasibility of long-distance implementations of mdiQKD within a reasonable time-frame of signal transmission.
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